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Personality Testing by the Schools:
A Possible Invasion of Privacy

ANGELIKA

HOYMAN

The maintenance of familial and individual privacy has long been a
valued cultural norm in Anglo-American society. For example, the
recognized "family unit" has been primarily nuclear, instead of extended
or polygamous, since the Eighteenth Century. A further indication of the
emphasis placed on privacy in this culture is found in the primacy of
one-family dwellings. The internal structure of these dwellings also attests
to the value placed on privacy. If servants are regularly present in the
home, they have their own private living quarters. Rooms are functionally
specialized so that dining activities are kept separate from sleeping ones,
etc., and sleeping ones are increasingly kept "individual" in that most
family members have their own bedrooms.'
The advancement of scientific knowledge and technology, especially as
directed to the human condition, has been equally valued. For instance,
public schools are teaching children the principles of general science at
an increasingly early age. The public voluntarily contributes to
institutions whose raison d'etre is the promotion of scientific research. 2 In
addition, millions of tax dollars are spent to support specifically
psychological research. 3
This support began around the turn of the century with the
development of the first "personality" measure in a test format, the
precursor of the widely accepted Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test.4 During
World War I, the United States government administered an early
psychological test, the "Army Alpha Examination", to over one million
servicemen. 5 Since then, the use of structured personality tests to measure
the two concepts of personality, the cultural-specific "normal-abnormal"
concept and the "dominant personality traits" concept,6 has become firmly
entrenched. Miller reports in The Assault on Privacy (1971) that in 1960
the Federal Office of Education financed what is termed a "Project
Talent". Approximately one million school children were given various
personality-measuring tests. The data collected by the project was
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computerized and funneled back to the respective school guidance
counselors. 7
Contemporary critics, concerned with the maintenance of personal
privacy, have termed the use of personality tests a "white glove rack and
screw" . Monroe H. Freedman, Dean of Hofstra University School of Law,
while testifying before a congressional subcommittee, compared the use of
psychological tests to the administration of truth serums and found both
to be an affront to personal dignity.9
Nevertheless, the 1960's witnessed a three-fold increase in the number
of school counselors employed in most schools and a nation-wide survey
of these counselors indicated that at least one-third of their time was
spent in dealing with the personal problems of students.' 0 It was only to
be expected that diagnostic aid would be sought more and more
frequently in the form of structured forced-choice psychological inventories,
especially in light of the intrinsic ease in administration and scoring of
such tests. In 1973 in Morristown, Pennsylvania, the inevitable occurred:
the inherent conflict between familial and individual privacy interests and
the use of personality tests came to a head in the case of Merriken v.
Cressman.1 '
In Merriken, the plaintiffs, eighth grade student Michael Merriken and
his mother, brought suit to enjoin the local school district from
implementing a program that employed the use of personality tests in
identifying potential drug users. The program, entitled "Critical Period
of Intervention", consisted in part of test questionnaires that delved into
the plaintiff's family background and into his perceptions of his family
relationships. He was also asked to identify classroom peers exhibiting
inappropriate or deviant behavior.
The second stage of the program was "intervention", an attempt to
"change the cognitive and affective domains of potential drug abusers"
through therapy that was specifically referred to as "compulsory".' 2 Those
students demonstrating consistently deviant behavior could receive group
sanctions as part of the therapy agenda. When "responsible school
personnel" felt that an individual student's needs exceeded school
resources, they would be able to refer such students and their families to
community mental health services. In addition, classroom teachers were
asked to serve as "role models" for two children identified by the tests as
"emotionally handicapped". When serving as such models for disturbed
children, the teachers were to receive background information on the
children.
As the program was originally proposed, no provision for the
requirement of affirmative parental consent was included and the students
were not to be informed of the "voluntary" nature of completing the
questionnaire. However, after suit was instituted, the school board
resolved to obtain such consent from parents and to tell students of their
option to refuse to participate in the program. The Court granted the
injunction on the grounds that the "Critical Intervention Program" would
constitute an invasion of the plaintiff's rights of privacy despite the
school board's attempt to gain parental consent.
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The Merriken court noted various areas of concern in enjoining the
implementation of the "Critical Period of Intervention" program. First, it
examined the actual test questions themselves and found that they invaded
the Constitutionally protected privacy of family relationships and child
rearing.
Second, the court was concerned that the consent the school board
obtained from the parents was less than satisfactory. The court held that
the consent received did not meet the required standards for waivers of
the Constitutional rights to privacy; they felt that the information given to
parents regarding the program was insufficient to ensure "informed" and
voluntary choices on their part. Particular attention was paid to the
possible negative effects of the testing on the children and the inadequate
presentation of such possible effects to the plaintiffs.
The ultimate use of the test results was another area of grave concern
to the court in Merriken; the fact that strict confidentiality of the results
was not maintained was specifically mentioned.
Following the analysis used by the Merriken court, it is the purpose
of this paper to analyze the test questions found in several widely used
personality inventories to determine the extent to which they violate zones
of privacy arguably emanating from the First and Fifth Amendments. The
potential adverse effects of testing, the adequacy of the information
presented to parents, and the confidentiality of test answers and scores
will also be considered. Finally, the balancing test used by the Merriken
court will be analyzed in terms of the factors to be considered when
balancing the state's interests against those of individuals and families,
and of the over-all implications of the balancing approach.
TEST QUESTIONS AS INVASIONS OF PRIVACY
In determining that the "Critical Period of Intervention" program
invaded Constitutionaly protected zones of privacy, the Merriken court
scrutinized the actual questions presented on the test questionnaire. The
court specifically noted questions dealing with whether or not the
plaintiff's family was "very close, somewhat close, not too close, or not
close at all", whether or not the plaintiff's parents told him "how much
they loved him", whether or not the plaintiff's parents seemed "to know
what his needs or wants are", and whether or not the plaintiff felt "loved
by his parents". Such questions were characterized as "highly personal"
and as pertaining "directly to an individual's family relationship and his
rearing."' 3 The conclusion of the court was that the entire family
relationship was second only to the marital one in terms of its highly
private nature and that the above questions' invasion of that private
relationship violated the plaintiffs' rights of privacy.
This decision of the Merriken court is supported by two recently
decided cases establishing a Constitutional basis for privacy rights. Ten
years ago the United States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut"
struck a Connecticut law that made the use of contraceptives by married
persons criminal. In doing so, the court held that marital relations were
encompassed in a "basic and fundamental" right of privacy protected by
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the Constitution from state abridgement.15 In 1973, the United States
Supreme Court again recognized the existence of Constitutionally
guaranteed rights of privacy in Roe v. Wade.16 The opinion in Roe found
that the Fourteenth Amendment assurances of personal liberty and privacy
embraced the right of a woman to abort unwanted pregnancies. In fact,
judicial opinions delineating the extent of these rights of privacy in view
of the Griswold decision (even before Roe) "consistently have upheld the
right of privacy with regard to home and family".' 7 Consequently, the
Merriken court's high valuation of familial privacy must be viewed as a
judicially sound one.
The Merriken court's treatment of the test questions suggested that
there are two analytically distinct zones of familial privacy: that of
childrearing specifically and that of the perceived emotional family
interactions and interrelations generally. The court stated that it would
examine "the factual situation as it relates to family relationships and
child rearing".' 8
The court cited Prince v. Massachusetts'9 as establishing the right in
the area of family relationships. In Prince the United States Supreme
Court held that familial relations were not beyond state regulation in the
public interest. Accordingly, it upheld a state statute prohibiting minors
from selling magazines in public places. However, in doing so the court
did acknowledge the "private realm of family life that the state cannot
enter".20

The Merriken court found precedent for the right of privacy in
childrearing in two cases. The first of these, Pierce v. Society of Sisters2 ',
involved a state statute requiring children to attend public schools. The
United States Supreme Court struck the statute for unconstitutionally
interfering with "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control". 2 2 In the second
case cited, Meyer v. Nebraska23, the United States Supreme Court found
unconstitutional a state statute forbidding the teaching of foreign
languages to anyone not having graduated from the eighth grade. It stated
that the state exceeded "the limitations upon the power of the state and
conflicts with rights assured to plaintiff in error". 2 4 Such "rights" were
earlier said to include the rights of individuals "to marry, establish a
home and bring up children". 25
The questions of four personality tests commonly administered in the
public schools were scrutinized in order to ascertain whether they invaded
the protected familial privacy zone of childrearing. The Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory2 6 (hereafter MMPI), the Mooney Problem
Checklist 27 , the California Personality Inventory2 8 (hereafter CPI), and the
Wood "Behavior Preference Schedule: What Would You Do"2 9 were chosen
because of their availability 0 and their popularity.3 ' All of them have been
in use for more than fifteen years and all of them are highly structured.
The MMPI is a battery of approximately 570 statements which the
respondent designates as being either true or false about himself.3 2 That
inventory has questions directly related to childrearing: "My parents and
family find more fault with me than they should,"3 3 "I have been quite
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independent and free from family rule," 4 and "My mother or father often
made me obey even when I thought it was unreasonable." 3 4
The Wood "Behavior Preference Record: What Would You Do", given
to children in grades four through twelve, also asks children about
childrearing matters. It consists of descriptions of various hypothetical
situations. For each situation three possible courses of action are described.
The respondent selects which of the three listed courses of action he
would pursue in that situation and then selects one of at least four
possible listed reasons for his behavior choice. In one hypothetical
situation the child is to imagine himself about to leave to play baseball
"with the gang" when his mother asks him to take his little sister along.
He knows that "the gang" will laugh at him. The suggested possible
behaviors are (1) do it anyway (take the sister), (2) stay at home, and (3)
explain why you don't want to do it. Possible reasons for the chosen
behavior include "It wouldn't do any good to explain [to the mother]"
and "Mother would understand and would not make you do it."36
The CPI is structurally similar to the MMPI. It contains
approximately 500 statements which respondent's classify as either true or
false about themselves. It posits such statements as "My parents have
often disapproved of my friends," "My parents wanted me to 'make good'
in the world" and "My people treat me more like a child than a
grownup.""
A final example is drawn from the junior high school form of the
Mooney Problem Checklist. Junior high school students are presented with
210 statements delineating possible subjective or objective conditions. They
are to mark those states of affairs that bother them. A space is provided
where they can indicate whether or not they would like to talk to a
school counselor about the bothersome areas. Among the things listed for
the students to designate as "problems" were "having to ask parents for
money", "having no regular allowance", "not allowed to run around with
the kids I like," "being treated like a small child at home", "not allowed
to have dates," and "being criticized by my parents". 3 8 Clearly, under the
Merriken decision, all of the above-described questions would be
unconstitutional intrusions into the realm of childrearing.
The protected zone of emotional family relationships has fared no
better in the inventories. For example, Miller reports that a thirty-one
page questionnaire that inquired into such things as which party was at
fault if the home was a "broken" one was given to seventh and ninth
grade students in Durham, North Carolina.3 9
The MMPI asks subjects to respond to statements such as "My father
was a good man," "I love my father very much," "I have reason to feel
jealous of one or more members of my family,"4 0 and "Some of my
family have habits that bother and annoy me very much."4 '
Students given the CPI are asked whether or not "Some of my family
have quick tempers," "My home life was always happy," "At times I
have been very anxious to get away from my family," "I have often gone
against my parents' wishes," "I have felt embarrassed over the type of
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work that one or more members of my family have done," "The things
some of my family have done have frightened me," "My parents never
really understood me" and are also asked to name the relative that they
are the "most attached to". 42
The Mooney Problem Checklist offers "never having any fun with
mother or dad", "family worried about money", "parents separated or
divorced", "parents favoring a brother or sister", "unable to discuss
certain problems at home", "family quarrels", and "wanting to live in a
different neighborhood" as sources of possible worry for a child.43
Furthermore, although the Merriken court did not specifically reach
the issue, strong arguments can be made for zones of privacy existing
beyond the family relationship. The majority opinion of Griswold referred
to penumbras of privacy derived from the First and Fifth Amendments. In
First Amendment zones of privacy, the court stressed that privacy was
important to the freedom of association. Concern was expressed that a
required exposure of beliefs, attitudes or associations would tend to chill
the expression of First Amendment rights." This theme had been
expressed several years earlier in Shelton v. Tucker4 5 and in NAACP v.
Alabama4 6 In Shelton, the constitutionality of a state requirement that
school teachers disclose every organization with which they were associated
was at issue. In striking the requirement, the United States Supreme
Court stated that such a requirement would "impair that teacher's right
to free association, a right closely allied to freedom of speech and a right
which, like free speech, lies at the foundations of a free society." 4 7 Two
years before deciding Shelton, the Supreme Court indicated its position by
noting a "vital relationship" between the freedom of association and the
privacy of association in NAACP. 48 Consequently, it would seem that
personality test questions revealing the family unit's political or religious
ties would be extremely objectionable.
Nevertheless, they abound. The MMPI requests reactions to such
political issues as "I am always disgusted with the law when a criminal
is freed through the arguments of a smart lawyer" 29 and "It would be
better if almost all laws were thrown away." 50 It directly inquires about
religious beliefs with the statements "Evil spirits possess me sometimes,"
"I believe in a life hereafter," 5 ' "My soul leaves my body," "I am a
special agent of God," "I believe there is a Devil and a Hell in afterlife,"
"I read the Bible several times a week" and "I pray several times a
week." 52
The CPI also posits such politically relevant statements as "Maybe
some minority groups do get rough treatment, but it is no business of
mine," "Only a fool would ever vote to increase his own taxes," "We
ought to let Europe get out of its own mess; it made its bed, let it lie
in it," "People should not have to pay taxes for the schools if they do
not have children" and "Disobedience to my government is never

justified."5
The Fifth Amendment's relationship to rights of privacy may also
present problems for personality tests. The United States Supreme Court
has held that incriminating statements gained as a result of custodial
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interrogations are not admissible evidence in criminal prosecutions,
Miranda v. Arizona.54 Although the case is not a strong one, parallels can
possibly be drawn between custodial interrogations and the school testing
setting. Therefore, questions on personality tests directly relating to
criminal activities and perhaps those relating merely to criminal
propensities may violate the Fifth Amendment guarantee against selfincrimination if the responses to them are introduced in juvenile
proceedings.
Once again, the widely used MMPI appears as a culprit. It elicits
information concerning acts constituting possible felonies in certain states
by requiring answers to "I have never been in trouble with the law," 1
have never been in trouble because of my sexual behavior," "I have never
indulged in any unusual sexual practices," 55 and "At times it has been
impossible for me to keep from stealing or shoplifting something."5 6
Miller reports that typical questions on personality tests include "Have you
ever engaged in sexual activities with another man or boy" (asked of
males) 57 .
In addition, information reflecting criminal propensities is routinely
asked of students. An example is the question: "If I could get into a
movie without paying and be sure I was not seen I would probably do
The CPI asks, "At times I have been so entertained by the cleverness
it."58
of a crook that I have hoped he would get by with it," "I used to steal
sometimes when I was a youngster," "If a person is clever enough to
cheat someone out of a large sum of money, he ought to be allowed to
keep it" and "Police cars should be specially marked so that you can see
them coming." 5 9
LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT
A major underpinning of the Merriken court's decision was its finding
that parents were not properly informed of the nature of the "Critical
Period of Intervention" program. As the court had determined that certain
of the test questions violated the plaintiff's fundamental rights of familial
privacy, insufficiently informed parental consent to those questions was
not considered to be a valid waiver of these rights. When First and Fifth
Amendment privacy rights are involved, the nature of the consent required
may be slightly different. While questions violating First Amendment
privacy zones may violate parental interests, they also violate interests
unique to the child, for the child, too, has an interest in maintaining the
privacy of his associations, religious habits, etc. The Fifth Amendment's
right against self-incrimination is even more peculiarly one vested solely
in the child. Hence, questions as to whether parents can effectively waive
their children's rights for them and whether children can effectively waive
their rights themselves in view of their status as minors must be dealt
with although they are beyond the scope of this paper.
Since the familial, First and Fifth Amendment privacy rights have all
been termed fundamental (supra), it is to be assumed that the same
standard for informed consent to their waiver would apply to all of them.
The Merriken court indicated that an adequate waiver in such a case
must be based on information of the same scope as is provided to surgery
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patients.60 Hence, such information should contain an extensive discussion
of the possible direct and indirect ill effects of participation in the
program and of the alternatives to participation in it.61 One reviewer has
noted that the court's imposition of such a stringent standard or test to
determine informed consent is a departure from previous practice in which
trial judges decided from the facts presented whether the consent given
was informed and voluntary instead of adhering to a specific test.62
However, the Merriken court finds backing for its position in the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Fuentes v. Shevin. 3 There the
court held that a contractual waiver of the plaintif's right to a hearing in
a replevin proceeding was ineffective. The fact that the plaintif was not
sufficiently told of the nature and possible consequences of such a waiver
was deemed sufficient to invalidate it.6 The court further noted that there
is a presumption against waivers of individual Constitutional rights in
civil as well as criminal cases. 65
The mandate of Brady v. United States,66 a criminal case, was also
relied upon by the Merriken court to support the imposition of its high
standards for waiver. In Brady the petitioner attempted to argue that his
waiver of his right to a full trial through a guilty plea should be held
invalid. In denying his claim, the United States Supreme Court stated that
"Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be
knowing, intelligent acts done with a sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences."67 (Emphasis added.)
Finally, there exists a further possible explanation and justification, for
the adherence to such a high standard of "informed consent" in the
administration of psychological tests: while the general populace is
presumed to have notice of the law and hence its rights under the law, it
is not presumed to have anything but a cursory level of knowledge about
psychology. In fact, Sherrer and Roston assert that the amount of
information readily available to and known by the populace with regard
to personality testing procedures in the schools is likely actually to be
similar to the information the populace has about surgery.68 For example,
they write that the majority of parents assume that any testing would be
done by "experts" in the field and would be kept confidential. However,
they report that the actual "school psychologist" usually only has a
master's degree and probably received that degree not from a psychology
department, as would be supposed, but from an education school. It is
probable that such persons have not had an actual "internship" in the
clinical psychological work.69 In short, they would be considered
"untrained" by experts. If parental knowledge about the administration of
the school testing program is this meager, certainly parental knowledge of
the test questions and purposes themselves can not be more plentiful. In
addition, the Merriken court specifically cited the lack of psychological
training that the "therapists" in the program had, perhaps intimating that
there was a certain "experimental" element in that aspect of the program
which might be harmful.7 2 It seems clear, therefore, that any descriptions
of therapy should include the extent to which persons administering such
therapy are qualified.
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The Merriken court's findings of fact also took note of the potential
harm done to the child by reason of his being exposed to the test
questions at all.73 Many of the test questions themselves could evoke
anxiety in the subjects. For instance, asking young subjects whether they
feel their parents understand them could suggest new evaluative
perspectives to the students that could generate discontent. Asking them to
choose the relative to whom they feel closest could spur guilt feelings and
mixed emotions. Similarly, MMPI 7 questions related to one's satisfaction
with one's sex life, one's predilection for members of the same sex, could
have a traumatic effect on young children. Also, questions about slight
paranoia such as whether the subject feels that people are watching him
much of the time would have a traumatic effect on some respondents.
Furthermore, the Merriken court mentioned a lack of clarity and
specificity in the categorization of students as "drug abusers" as a
shortcoming of the "Critical Period of Intervention" program. The
inference to be drawn from this is that parents must be informed of all
the possible "scales" or diagnoses that can be made from a test. After
receiving such information, for instance, a parent may agree to have his
child's personality tested for indications of possible schizophrenia but may
not want his child's masculinity-femininity quotients indexed.
There are indications that subjects who are aware of a test's diagnostic
purpose can confound test results by giving false responses." For example,
assume an adolescent male who knows he is being screened for
homosexuality and who is knowledgeable about the Freudian belief that
homosexuality is caused in part by an overly close relationship between
the male and his mother. If he needed to, he could falsely describe his
relationship with his mother as a distant one in order to receive an
inaccurate, "normal" score.
Nevertheless, the possibility of the deliberate falsification of test results
is not so great as to outweigh the interests parents have in being aware
of what their children are being tested for. It is apparent that the average
student is highly unlikely to actually possess the necessary sophistication
in psychological theory to invalidate test scores. Additionally, as the
knowledge of testing theory and design increases, more and more tests are
incorporating built-in corrections for, or at least detections of, falsification
of answers.7 6
The interest parents have in knowing what their children are being
tested for would not even be adequately protected if they could screen test
questions and strike those they found too revealing. They simply would
not be able to determine what it was that responses to the questions
would be divulging without extensive training. For example, one of many
questions on the MMPI indicating a person's predilection to depression is
one asking if the respondent believes in the second coming of Christ.'7
The average person certainly could not know that a negative answer to
this question would evince depressive tendencies. Nor could a reasonable
person easily determine that whether or not he is easily awakened by
noise and whether or not he has spells of hay fever or asthma indicates
his depressive potential,'8 that whether or not he enjoys detective or
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mystery stories and at times has felt like swearing indicates his potential
for hysteria,79 or that whether or not he likes school indicates his
likelihood of being a psychopathic deviate.8 0
Finally, the last informational requirement of the Merriken court's test
for truly "informed" consent also involves the actual test questions
themselves. The Merriken decision only tangentially noted this aspect by
making a finding to the effect that parents were not given an opportunity
in the Pennsylvania situation to see the test questions. 8 ' However, it is
obvious that parents must be able to have access to such information in
order to make any sort of intelligent and "informed" decision about
whether they would find waiving their rights of privacy objectionable.
Opponents can argue that prior exposure to test questions often is
thought to invalidate test results in that responses are only properly
"genuine" when they are spontaneous.82 However, such an argument
would not carry much weight. In the school testing situation, the
children, not the parents, are being tested. Therefore, parents could easily
be allowed to review test questions at the school. If they were not
allowed to take copies of the questions home with them the chances of
their repeating actual test questions to their children would be
diminished. Again, as was noted above, psychological testing techniques
are becoming increasingly able to counter the problems caused by
sophisticated subjects.
USE OF TEST RESULTS AS AN INVASION OF PRIVACY
The Merriken court also expressed deep concern about the fact that
the test results would not be kept strictly confidential. In the fact
situation presented, the court only needed to deal with the confidentiality
of the diagnosis or categorization of the child resulting from an
evaluation of his answers on the questionnaires given and not with the
confidentiality of the specific answers given to the questions. However,
there is no reason to believe that the same considerations would not
apply to the confidentiality of both test answers and test diagnoses. The
court stated that "the ultimate use of this information, although possibly
gained with a great deal of scientific success, is the most serious problem
that faces the court."8 3
Budding judicial support for the court's concern with the
confidentiality of psychological data is readily at hand. In In re
Lifschutz84 the Supreme Court of California denied a psychotherapist the
right to assert that communications made to him by a patient were
privileged when the patient himself wanted them introduced in evidence.
In doing so, however, the court applied Griswold's privacy holding to the
psychotherapist-patient relationship with the dicta that "[The United
States Supreme Court declared that 'Various guarantees [of the Bill of
Rights] create zones of privacy,' and we believe that the confidentiality of
the psychotherapeutic session falls within such zone."8 5 Compelling policy
reasons for extending a privileged, confidential status to the
psychotherapist-patient relationship were given by the court in Taylor v.
United States.8 6 The trial court had admitted the testimony of a physician,
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at the mental hospital in which the defendant had been confined until he
was competent to stand trial, in finding him guilty of robbery, larceny
and housebreaking. The federal appellate court held the admission of the
testimony to be reversible error and stated that "Many physical ailments
might be treated with some degree of effectiveness by a doctor whom the
patient did not trust, but a psychiatrist must have a patient's confidence
or he cannot help him." 87 In view of the great similarity of personal
student counseling to psychotherapy, no adequate reasons have been given
for distinguishing between the two.
A rather strong argument for the confidentiality of student test results
can be made even without judicial precedent. The four conditions
generally required for communications to be considered privileged are (1)
that confidentiality be essential to the satisfactory maintenance of the
relationship, (2) that the communication originated with the expectation
that it would be confidential, (3) that the relationship is one that should
be fostered, and (4) that the injury to the relationship by the disclosure of
communications is greater than the benefits from the disclosure. 8 The
first condition, that of the privilege being essential to the relationship,
appears to have been well established by the language of the Lifschutz
and Taylor courts (supra).
The second condition, that the communications originated with the
expectation that they be confidential also appears to be satisfied, at least
in part. The physical setting in which most school counseling takes place
would indicate to the students that the meeting, and therefore the
relationship, is a confidential one. A survey in 1966-67 of Iowa schools
revealed that 84% of the counseling rooms were private offices.89 It would
be natural for students to assume that any tests they took for guidance
purposes would also be kept confidential, especially if they were taken in
the guidance office.
Problems would remain, however, with test scores not received as a
direct result of a counseling relationship or not received for counseling
purposes. When tests are routinely given to an entire class of students in
the same manner in which students' eyes are checked, a special,
confidential counselor-student relationship with its accompanying
expectations may be most difficult to prove. However, it should be
remembered that the closeness of the student-counselor relationship is only
relevant as an indicator of the student's expectation of confidentiality.
Other factors may so strongly point to such an expectation as to override
the factor of a distant relationship. In this instance the very nature of the
test and the questions on it (see examples, supra) would strongly suggest
that the communicator assumed that his responses would be kept private.
Satisfaction of the third condition, that the relationship is one that
should be fostered, might appear to be self-evident. As the state itself
provided for the counseling services in the first place, it could hardly be
heard to argue that the relationship is one it has no interest in
encouraging. The fourth condition, that the benefits of confidentiality
outweigh the benefits of disclosure, involves the simple balancing of the
interests involved. As the validity of test scores depends upon the students'
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trust, it might seem that the assurance of confidentiality is so vital as to
surpass any other considerations. Surely the specter of non-confidential but
non-meaningful data being gathered is a ludicrous one.
Further discussion of the balancing of the various state and individual
interests in personality testing is found infra with the discussion of the
Merriken court's use of a balancing test.
The judicial precedent of the Lifschutz and the Taylor cases and the
fact that the four requirements for privileged status could arguably be met
by the school personality testing situation still would not alleviate the
problems that concerned the Merriken court. The privileged status argued
for would only prevent the test answers and diagnoses from being used in
court. While it would protect students' Fifth Amendment rights against
self-incrimination, it would do nothing to protect them from the dangers
of "scapegoating" and labeling by school personnel and whomever else
received access to the results.
How confidential are, and how restricted is access to, such diagnoses
in the average school system? Before the recent passage of the federal
"Buckley Amendment,"" only thirteen states had statutes explicitly
protecting student-counselor communications.9 1 Of the thirteen statutes
involved, seven restricted the privilege to counselors that were state
certified, 92 and eight of them provided for the waiver of the privilege in
various special circumstances.93 Of the eight that had waiver provisions,
only four required the consent of the student or his parents to such
waiver.9 4 The remaining five statutes without waiver provisions have all
been criticized for defects such as vagueness. 95 Thus, it was not at all
certain whether personality test scores and diagnoses would necessarily be
considered "student-counselor communications" under the five statutes.
None of the statutes attempted to restrict school personnel, or even other
outside parties such as prospective employers, from having access to the
students' records. Therefore, each individual school system could use its
discretion in dispensing personality test scores. Very little data exist on
actual school practices in this regard. It is thought however, that the
majority of school systems refused to disseminate the information gleaned
from personality tests to persons outside the school system while they did
allow interested teachers access to it.96
The "Buckley Amendment" allays the problem of confidentiality
somewhat. The act stipulates that for a school to receive federal funding,
it may not release any portion of a student's records to any person
without written parental consent specifying the records to be released and
to whom they shall be released. These records specifically include
personality test scores. A copy of the records must be made available to
any parent desiring one and a list of persons receiving the information
will be held to further protect its confidential status. It is unclear whether
the Merriken court's complete test for "informed consent" should be
applied to parental consent to the release of records involving personality
measures as it is to the making of the record in the first place.
Exempted from the above requirements of parental consent are school
officials, such as teachers; officials of other schools in which the child
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will enroll as long as the parents know of the transfer, receive a copy of
the record and have a chance to challenge information in it; authorized
representatives of the Comptroller General of the United States, the
Secretary, an administrative head of an education agency and state
educational authorities; and offices to which the student has applied for
financial aid.
The fact that other school personnel have access to whatever
psychological diagnoses may have been made from personality inventories
was exactly one of the concerns of the Merriken court. The lack of
supplemental state regulation protecting psychological data has been noted
above. Therefore, unless each school system itself enshrouds personality
inventory results with a special, confidential status and restricts access to
the school psychologist, the very dangers of labeling and scapegoating
noted in the Merriken decision are still present.
THE MERRIKEN COURT'S "BALANCING" TEST
How are courts to resolve the remaining problem with confidentiality?
Even when the Merriken standards for informed consent have been met, is
it possible that the lack of proposed confidentiality or perhaps yet other
problems with the program, such as ones with the predictive validity of
the tests employed, would lead a court to prohibit its implementation?
Language in the Merriken decision hints at the possibility that all
personality testing would be unconstitutional whether informed consent
were given or not. After discussing the lack of informed parental consent
to the program, the court went on to stress that "the credibility of the
confidentiality of this program breaks down when the potential drug
abusers are reported to the school superintendent," 97 that "[tihe actual
testing of the student and the results gained are suspect" 9 8 and that "the
margin of error must be almost nil" 9 9 before diagnostic labels are attached
to students.
However, closer scrutiny demonstrates that the Merriken decision did
not entail a blanket prohibition of all personality testing by the schools.
Instead, the Merriken court employed a balancing test in coming to its
resolution of the remaining problems in the program and limited its
decision to the situation before it. It stated that "The Court, in balancing
the right of an individual to privacy and the right of the government to
invade that privacy, strikes the balance in favor of the individual in the
czrcumstances shown in this case." 0 o (Emphasis added.) And earlier the
court had stated that it "balances the invasion of privacy against the
public need for a program."lo
The Merriken court drew support for its imposition of a balancing
standard from the opinion in Barenblatt v. United States.0 2 In that case,
plaintiff Barenblatt was prosecuted for contempt for refusing to answer the
questions of the House Committee on Un-American Activities concerning
his past Communist activities. While the Supreme Court struck the
balance in favor of the government, the case is important because it did
employ a balancing test. The opinion stated that "where First Amendment
rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation resolution of the
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issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing privacy
and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown." 103
Furthermore, balancing tests have been used with increasing frequency
where privacy-related rights are involved. For example, the need for
administrative searches was balanced against the intrustion of individual
rights caused by such searches by the Supreme Court in Camara v.
Municipal Court.'0 4 The state's interest in regulating pornographic
materials was found outweighed by an individual's privacy rights in his
own home by the Supreme Court in Stanley v. Georgia.05
Undoubtedly the most influential case in establishing a balancing
approach in privacy litigation was the aforementioned Roe v. Wade. In it
the Supreme Court determined that an individual's right of privacy
encompassed the right of a women to terminate an unwanted pregnancy.
In balancing that individual interest against the state's interest in the
health of the woman, the court concluded that the individual's interest
was the weightier for the first trimester of pregnancy, that the two
interests were at a near stand-off during the second trimester, therefore
allowing such state regulation as was reasonably related to the state
interest, and that the state's interest became so compelling in the third
trimester that it justified an encroachment on the individual rights
involved.
Exactly what individual interests did the Merriken court balance
against the state benefits from personality testing? The quoted language
above, that the court "balances the invasion of privacy against the public
need for a program", seems to provide a straightforward answer to the
question; the court simply looked at the extent to which privacy interests
were violated. When the invasion of privacy by the testing program
reached a certain point in magnitude, became such a large or serious
invasion as to outweigh any possible benefits to the state, then the testing
program was enjoined.
However, a second look at the Merriken court's opinion indicates that
the individual interests that the court balanced against those of the state
are not that simple; they are not simply the individual interests in the
maintenance of privacy. Actually, the court looked to the entire needs of
the individual - not just to his need for privacy. Once it determined
that an individual's privacy was violated, it looked beyond the violation
to the damage that such a violation did to an individual's other interests.
The predilection of the court to look beyond the privacy interest violated
was evidenced in its concern that parents be informed not only of the
ways in which the test intruded upon their and their child's privacy, but
also of the ways in which the testing program could negatively affect
their child. In specifically stating the reasons for enjoining the "Critical
Period of Intervention" program, the court noted both the lack of
informed consent received and the fact that "[tlhere is too much of a
chance that the wrong people for the wrong reasons will be singled out
and counseled in the wrong manner." 0 6 The quoted statement clearly
shows that the court looked to the total possible harm to the individual,
not just the harm to individual privacy interests. Being wrongly singled
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out and then "counseled in the wrong manner" has little relation to
privacy. However, its possible harmful effect to the person so counseled is
clear. Therefore, it would seem that the state could justify invasions of
privacy only when the benefits to the state were greater than the total
injuries to the individual caused by the invasion, instead of merely when
the benefits to the state outweighed the extent of the privacy invasion.
The court's looking beyond the privacy interest invaded to the harm
caused by the invasion is not totally unprecedented. Another case in
which privacy rights were litigated was Roe (supra). In reaching its
decision in Roe the Supreme Court also did not restrict itself to merely
determining the extent to which privacy rights were invaded, but balanced
the total possible injury to the individual by the violation of privacy
against the state's interest. That is, immediately after communicating in
one sentence that a woman's right to privacy encompasses her right to
terminate unwanted pregnancies, the court launched into a discussion of
the various evils to the woman that would occur if such a right were not
protected.o107
Balancing of the individual privacy interests vs. state interests
An interesting question left unresolved to date is what the state's
interest in personality testing is, i.e., what the state benefits are against
which the harm to individuals is balanced, and whether those benefits
could legally be characterized as constituting a "compelling" state interest.
The Merriken opinion did not explicitly term the state's interest in a
student's possible personality aberrations to be a "compelling" one. It did,
however, specifically designate the individual interest involved to be a
"fundamental" one (supra). It also very obviously used a "balancing"
method of analysis (supra). One observer has asserted that, to date, the
use of a balancing test has only been sanctioned by the United States
Supreme Court when both a "fundamental" individual right and a
"compelling" state interest have been found. 08 Both the Roe and
Barenblatt cases were cited as supporting this assertion; in both cases the
Supreme Court did find both an existent "compelling" state interest and a
"fundamental" individual interest before employing a balancing test.,o" As
the Merriken court had found the individual interest before it to be a
fundamental one, had not designated the state interest before it to be a
compelling one, and did employ a balancing test, three possible
explanations for its use of the balancing test can be made: (1) that the
Merriken court erred in applying a balancing mode of analysis because a
fundamental individual interest automatically overrides all but "compelling" state interests; (2) that the court effected a de facto elevation of
the status of the state's interest to that of a "compelling" one since it did
use a balancing test; or (3) that the court did not "err" in its use of a
balancing test but that judicial precedent exists for the balancing of
fundamental rights against non-compelling state interests.
It is obvious that if the first explanation - that the Merriken court
simply erred in its use of a balancing test to resolve a clash between
fundamental individual interests and non-compelling state interests - is
accepted, then state interests in personality testing have not yet been
40

labeled "compelling". Likewise, if the third explanation-that the court
had support for applying a balancing test without having made a prior
determination that a "compelling" state interest was abridging a
"fundamental" individual one - is accepted, state interests in such testing
have not been given "compelling" status. Only the second explanation
would purport to give it such status.
Of course, post hoc explanations of what a court intended by its
behavior are always tenuous at best. In this case, it seems that the third
explanation is the one most supported by the court's opinion. Other than
one brief mention of the state's interest in "possibly prevent[ing] drug
abuse","10 the court gives no indication that the state's interest is a highly
valued one, gives no indication at all that it considered it a "compelling"
one. However, the court does demonstrate that it believes its employment
of a balancing technique is supportable; it made a point of drawing
attention to its use of the balancing test (supra). It stated that "The court
recognizes that the Supreme Court has spoken and Law Review
authorities have spoken about a balancing test. What this means is that
the Court balances the invasion of privacy against the public need for a
program. . .a."III The above language contains no hint that the Merriken
court felt that the Supreme Court or the "Law Review authorities" still
required a prior finding of a compelling state interest. Therefore, it
supports the interpretation that the court felt that applying a balancing
test without finding "compelling" and "fundamental" interests was
supportable.
What does such a balancing approach imply for the future resolution
of cases factually similar to Merriken? The various negative effects of
school personality testing were delineated by the Merriken court (supra) as
including (1) a possible "self-fulfilling prophecy" effect, where a child
diagnosed and labeled as having certain problems simply fulfills the
expectations of the persons around him and actually develops such
problems; (2) a "scapegoating" effect, where a child diagnosed as having
problems or a child refusing to be tested is singled out by his teachers or
his peers for unpleasant attention; (3) a traumatic effect just from being
exposed to certain test questions; and, (4) the possible harmful effects of
receiving therapy from persons other than trained psychologists. When the
rather high probability that a misdiagnosis will be made is considered
along with the above possible effects of a correct diagnosis, the state's
interest in the testing must be an overwhelmingly high one in order to
justify the possible harm it could cause.
Since the state's interest in personality testing by the schools has not
yet been characterized as even a compelling one, it is unlikely to
outweigh the dangers judicially found to be caused by it. However, future
courts may easily find the state's interest to be more significant perhaps even compelling - if the fact situation were to be slightly
different from the one presented in Merriken. The only interest presented
to the Merriken court was one of ferreting out potential drug abusers. It
is very probable that a school testing program whose purpose is the
detection of serious existing personality defects would be thought of much
more highly. The sound mental health of the general populace is
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essential to American society and there is now evidence that special efforts
must be made to maintain such mental health. As early as 1962, an
estimated 2.5 million to 4.5 million out of approximately 60 million
children under the age of fourteen were in need of psychological
counseling or therapy.1 12
The schools are the logical agency to do such testing. If all children
are to be routinely tested, the schools provide the most convenient site for
the testing because the children are all gathered there in an orderly
manner. If only certain children, those ready suspected of having
personality aberrations, are to be tested, authorities assert that deciding
which children should be tested is not best left to parents." 3 It is noted
that a child's teachers are more able to detect abnormalities than are
parents because they compare the child to a classroom of peers. Teachers
are also apt to be more knowledgeable about community health agencies
than are parents. In addition, it is urged that a child's teachers should
have access to test results." 5 The teachers are said to spend the first few
months of class time making their own subjective determinations of their
students' psychological needs. If, instead, they had professional evaluations
of their students' needs, they would not have to waste those few months
of class and could begin meeting the childrens needs sooner." 6
A court balancing these state considerations against the harm caused
by testing might have a more difficult time in "striking the balance for
the individual" than the Merriken court did. Certainly a demonstration of
the pervasiveness of mental problems among school children could
convince a court to class the state's interest in detecting and treating
such problems in the schools "compelling". However, it is to be doubted
that a court would be persuaded by the portion of the argument in favor
of teachers' having access to test results. In view of school teachers'
extremely minimal training in psychology, the extent to which they can
be of value to students with severe personality disorders is speculative and
the possible detriment they can do to students through labeling and
"scapegoating" is clear. At the very least, therefore, a school testing
program attempting to justify its invasion of familial privacy must still
provide for strict confidentiality in order to substantially reduce the
negative effects that can flow from that invasion of privacy.
The question remains whether the benefits from such a program will
then justify its invasion of familial and individual privacy. Can the state
interest in a school personality testing program that employs tests of high
predictive validity, that guards against labeling and "scapegoating" effects
by restricting access to test answers and results to qualified school
psychologists, and that provides for fully informed consent by parents in
accordance with the Merriken standards, outweigh the individual interests
involved? Since the negative effects of testing to the individual would be
minimized, the state interest would be primarily balanced against the
individual privacy interest invaded by test questions and diagnoses.
That the right of privacy is highly regarded in legal circles is
demonstrated in Westin's book, Privacy and Freedom."7 In it he asserts
that the right of privacy performs four services vital to a free society: (1)
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it protects the personal autonomy and development of individuality that is
necessary for a successful democracy, (2) it provides for the emotional
release necessary to the successful maintenance of social roles in public,
(3) it allows for self-evaluation and the integration of individual
experiences, and (4) it ensures that communications are protected so as to
encourage intimate relationships.11 8 Naturally, it is difficult to see how
any governmental interest could be said to outweigh the need to ensure
the continued success of a democratic form of government!
Nevertheless, the governmental interest in personality testing can also
be described as one necessary for the maintenance of a democracy. It is
obvious that persons with severe personality malfunctions are not capable
of taking part in the democratic process. Anti-social actions by such
persons could wreak enough havoc to upset the entire existing social
order. Furthermore, personality testing has no effect whatsoever on
necessary emotional release, self-evaluation and integration, and intimate
relationships. The only above-listed function of privacy that personality
testing could possibly encroach upon is the first one, the protection of
personal autonomy and the development of individuality. However, it
would appear axiomatic that interests in individuality per se could not
possibly go so far as to protect mentally unsound individuals.
It has also been noted that the extent to which families are "private"
largely determines the extent to which they are "functional". Since recent
court decisions have protected familial privacy, it is argued that the
functionality of families in this culture must be highly valued. 20
The argument, however, is much too simple. One "function" of a
family is to produce mentally sound individuals. As the goals of the
family and of the testing program are both to produce mentally healthy
persons, the question to be resolved is whether a school testing program
would further that goal more effectively than would its prohibition, e.g.,
the family left to its own devices. When the testing program is especially
tailored (as above described), bringing all possible harmful effects from its
implementation to a minimum, and its major remaining drawback is a
per se violation of familial and/or individual privacy, it would appear
that the violation of privacy is justified by the benefits to the state in
fostering the mental health of its populace.
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